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family court the due that the Constitution had in mind for it.
The family court emerges wholly new from the recent constitutional
article, and the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganiza-
tion was at pains to implement the article to effectuate the broad
purposes it had in mind for the family court. It did this in the
Family Court Act. Should the supreme court retain jurisdiction
of a matter cognizable in the family court, the fourth department
opinion states the supreme court would be required constitutionally
to follow the procedures of the Family Court Act. This appears
to compromise the apparent conflict without upsetting the principle
of broad jurisdiction inherent in the supreme court.
ARTICLE 10 - PARTIES GENERALLY
Judgment against non-appealing third party plaintiff reversed
on appeal taken by third party defendant.
In Rome Cable Corp. v. Tanney,105 an employer commenced
an action against its employee to recover the amount it had paid
a third person in settlement of a claim arising out of the employee's
alleged negligence. The employee impleaded' 0 6 the third person's
employer, who became the third party defendant in the action. The
trial court rendered a judgment for the employer against the
employee, and for the employee against the third party defendant.
The third party defendant was the only one to appeal. The ap-
pellate division, fourth department, reversed, and held that the
third party defendant could challenge infirmities of plaintiff's judg"
ment against the third party plaintiff in the main action, even
though the third party plaintiff had not appealed from the judg-
ment against him. Furthermore, since the plaintiff in the main
action had failed to make out a prima facie case with respect to its
right to indemnity from the defendant (third party plaintiff), the
judgment against the latter would also be reversed.
Under CPA § 193-a(2) the third party defendant had the
right to appeal from the judgment in the main action, even though
the defendant in the main action had not appealed. Today, the
essence of CPA § 193-a(2) is incorporated into CPLR 1008.
The interesting aspect of the Rome case is that the judgment
was reversed as to the third party plaintiff, who had not appealed
from the judgment entered against him. The Rome case is in
256 App. Div. 68, 72, 9 N.Y.S.2d 210, 215 (3d Dep't 1939). But see Jones
v. Reilly, 68 App. Div. 116, 74 N.Y. Supp. 243 (1st Dep't 1902) and Janks
v. Braveman, 188 Misc. 373, 67 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct 1947).
10521 App. Div. 2d 342, 250 N.Y.S.2d 304 (4th Dep't 1964).
'10 CPLR 1007 gives the defendant the right to proceed against a person
who is not a party in the action, when the party "may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him...."
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conflict with Frankel v. Berman,0 7 a first department case. In
Frankel, the court reversed a judgment against the third-party
defendant who had appealed, but declined to disturb the judgment
against the defendant in the main action, who had not appealed,
even though the court found that the plaintiff had failed to estab-
lish a cause of action.
The CPLR,108 like its prior law counterpart, 0 9 appears to
support the determination of the Rome case by giving the third
party defendant all the rights "of a party adverse to the other
parties," expressly including the right of appeal.
Motion papers to substitute parties must be served on them in
manner of summons.
In Lewis v. Lewis"'0 the defendant died after commencement
of the action. Plaintiff moved for an order, pursuant to CPLR
1015(a), to continue the action against the executrices of the
estate. Defendant was a resident of Florida and the executrices
were appointed in that state.
The court denied the motion, noting that service on the execu-
trices must be given in the appropriate manner. The court stated
that "if notice is given to a non-party to be substituted, it is served
in the same way as a summons pursuant to Article 3 of the
CPLR. . . ." 1' The court cited as well CPLR 1921, which pro-
vides that a person may be made a party defendant if he does not
voluntarily appear. The word "defendant" was a change in lan-
guage from a prior draft which read "by service of a summons"
and, as indicated in the Revisers' notes, no change in meaning was
intended .
2
The practitioner's attention is called to the fact that, although
the papers must be served as a summons, there is no need to start
over. When a substitution is required, the action continues "in
all respects as if the substituted party had been in the action from
the beginning 'and all prior proceedings are valid and opera-
tive.' ,,113 In other words, once substitution of the appropriate
party is accomplished, the litigation continues from the point it had
reached at the time the event requiring substitution took place.
107 10 App. Div. 2d 838, 199 N.Y.S.2d 261 (lst Dep't 1960).
108 See the last sentence of CPLR 1008.
109 CPA § 193-a(2).
110 43 Misc. 2d 349, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
I11 Lewis v. Lewis, 43 Misc. 2d 349, 349-50, 250 N.Y.S.2d 984, 986 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).112 FIFTH REP. 323-24.
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